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Latent Disabilities Under the Social Security Act:
Cassel v. Harris
Frances Cassel applied for disability benefits under section
223(a) of the Social Security Act' (the Act) after having accu-
mulated twenty quarters of coverage. Although Cassel had not
accumulated her covered quarters within the forty quarters
preceding the onset of her total disability as the Act requires, 2
her disability had occurred under circumstances that suggested
that it might have been a latent disability 3-that is, "an impair-
ment that originated when [she] was insured but did not
become disabling until [her] coverage expired."4 Notwith-
standing the evidence suggesting a latent disability, the Secre-
1. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1976). For a general history of the Social Security Act
and the events leading to its enactment, see P. DOUGLAS, SOCIAL SEcURrrY IN
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1939).
An individual who wishes to receive Social Security disability insurance
benefits initiates the procedure by filing an application for disability insurance
benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 422.505(a) (1980) (form SSA-16). A claims representative
of the Social Security Administration (SSA) substantiates the claim and pro-
vides any assistance to the applicant necessary in preparing his or her applica-
tion and in obtaining the proof required in support. Id. § 422.130(b). For a
more detailed description of the claims procedure, see A. ABRAHAM & D.
KOPELmAN, FEDERAL SOCIAL SEcumrry 105-26 (1979).
2. See notes 11-12 infra and accompanying text.
3. Plaintiff Cassel's lawyer argued that Cassel had rheumatoid arthritis,
deterioration of the back, and emotional problems in 1976 although diagnosis
occurred after the onset of the disability. See Letter from Adam M. Dalmy to
Joseph E. Doneghy, SSA (Oct. 24, 1980) (on file with the Minnesota Law Re-
view).
4. Cassel v. Harris, 493 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (D. Colo. 1980). The Cassel
court used the terms "latent disability" and "progressive medical condition" in-
terchangeably. In medical terms "latent" denotes the period of an infectious
disease before the appearance of the symptoms of the disease. T. STEDMAN,
STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICnIONARY (21st ed. 1966). "Progressive," on the other
hand, denotes the course of a disease, especially when the course is unfavora-
ble. Id. Although the court more often used the term "latent disability," it
seems to have had "progressive medical condition" in mind. For example, the
only time the court discussed the ramifications of its decision it stated, "[a]
contrary decision would disregard the special plight of those persons who con-
tribute to the nation's output, but who become too sick to work regularly-then
grow progressively sicker, but not sick enough to obtain disability benefits until
they no longer are currently insured." 493 F. Supp. at 1058. The "genesis" of a
"latent disability" that the court referred to probably means the time of the ap-
pearance of the symptoms of the disease. For consistency, however, the term
"latent disability" will be used throughout this Comment.
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tary of Health and Human Services (HHS)5 denied Cassel's
application on the ground that Cassel had not been insured for
disability insurance benefits when she allegedly became dis-
abled. Upon review of the Secretary's decision,6 the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado remanded the
case for more specific administrative findings, holding that if
Cassel could "demonstrate a present disability that is clearly
and directly trac~able to a condition having its inception when
she was covered by disability insurance, HHS should find her
qualified for disability insurance benefits." Cassel v. Harris, 493
F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (D. Colo. 1980).
Under section 223(a) of the Social Security Act, an individ-
ual is eligible for disability insurance benefits if he or she (1) is
insured for disability insurance benefits, (2) is under age sixty-
five, (3) has filed an application, and (4) is under a disability.7
The second and third requirements are readily determinable,
while the "insured" and "disability" requirements are further
defined by the Act.8 Prior to 1958 an individual was insured for
5. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has been
redesignated the Department of Health and Human Services. Department of
Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3508(a) (Supp. 1I 1979).
6. Judicial review of any final decision of the Secretary, made after a
hearing to which the individual seeking review was a party, is available in the
United States District Courts. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976). The standard of review
is whether the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Id.
In Social Security disability cases substantial evidence is "more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
In this case Cassel contended that the Administrative Law Judge (ALT)
abused his discretion and erred as a matter of law by failing to apply the
proper legal standards and by making a factual determination without consid-
ering certain evidence of her alleged disability. The district court, however,
found that the ALT had applied the proper legal standard. Cassel v. Harris, 493
F. Supp. 1055, 1056 (D. Colo. 1980). The legal standard for determining disabil-
ity is whether a person can engage in substantial gainful activity. See note 13
infra and accompanying text. The AJ found only that Cassel had "no signifi-
cant impairment," but the court was satisfied with the ALTJ's statment that it is
only through an assessment of the limitations on a person's physical and
mental functions that a meaningful decision can be made with respect to the
ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. 493 F. Supp. at 1056.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1976).
8. Section 223(a) of the Act reads in relevant part-
(1) Every individual who-
(A) is insured for disability insurance benefits (as deter-
mined under subsection (c) (1) of this section),
(B) has not attained the age of sixty-five,
(C) has filed application for disability insurance benefits, and
(D) is under a disability (as defined in subsection (d) of this
section),
Shall be entitled to a disability insurance benefit.
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disability benefits only if he or she had 1) at least six quarters
of coverage during the thirteen-quarter period directly preced-
ing total disability, and 2) twenty quarters of coverage during
the forty-quarter period preceding the date of total disability.9
The 1958 amendment to the Act deleted the six-out-of-thirteen-
quarters requirement. 0 Today an individual is insured for dis-
ability insurance benefits if he or she has not less than twenty
quarters" of coverage during the forty-quarter period ending
with the onset of disability.12
The Act also defines the "disability" requirement: an indi-
vidual is disabled if he or she is unable "to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determi-
nable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.' 3
Courts have generally held that the Social Security Act, as
a remedial statute, should be construed liberally to find disabil-
ity.14 Nevertheless, in interpreting the "insured" and "disabil-
42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1976).
9. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 214, 64 Stat. 477
(1950) as amended by Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 223, 70
Stat. 807 (1956).
10. Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, § 204(b), 72
Stat. 1013 (1958) (amending definition, in section 223, of insured).
11. The terms "quarter" and "calendar quarter" both mean a period of
three calendar months enaing on March 31, June 30, September 30, December
31. Id. § 413(a)(1). See 45 Fed. Reg. 25,387 (1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. §
404.140).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) (1) (1976). The present twenty-out-of-forty-
quarters requirement is determined by examining the individual's earnings
record. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEW, SOCIAL SEcuRrT ADMINISTRATION,
SOCIAL SECU~rrY HANDBOOK 21 (6th ed. 1978). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.801-
404.803 (1980); A. ABRAHAM & D. KOPELMAN, supra note 1, at 127-30. For a deter-
mination of disability insured status, see 45 Fed. Reg. 25,385 (1980) (to be codi-
fied in 20 C.F.R. § 404.110).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (A) (1976). The regulations state that the determi-
nation of whether an impairment constitutes a disability is determined from all
the pertinent facts and that this determination may be based on medical con-
siderations alone or on medical considerations and certain vocational factors
such as age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (1980) as
amended by 45 Fed. Reg. 55,588 (1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
The leading case on what factors are to be considered in assessing disabil-
ity is Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962). In Underwood, the
court listed four factors: (1) the objective medical facts, (2) diagnoses or medi-
cal opinions based on those facts, (3) subjective evidence of pain and disability
testified to by the claimant and corroborated by others, and (4) the claimant's
educational background, age, and work experience. Id. at 851.
14. The "liberal construction" rule has been applied in most jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978); Mandrell v. Wein-
berger, 511 F.2d 1102, 1103 (10th Cir. 1975); Hess v. Secretary of HEW, 497 F.2d
837, 840 (3d Cir. 1974); De Paepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 101 (5th Cir. 1972);
1004 [Vol. 65:1002
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ity" requirements of the Act, courts have uniformly held that
disability insurance benefits are available only to individuals
who become disabled prior to the expiration of their insured
status. 15 Most of these courts have focused only upon the date
of the onset of total disability as defined by the Act and have
not commented on the date of the origin of the disabling condi-
tion. The few courts that have decided cases in which the date
of the origin of the disability was at issue have uniformly held
that an individual must be disabled, as defined under the Act,
on his or her last insured date, even when the individual is cur-
rently disabled due to an impairment that had its origin during
a period of insured status.16
Courts have, however, allowed the introduction of subse-
quently derived evidence-that is, evidence derived after the
claimant's last insured date-as probative in deciding whether
the claimant was disabled on that date.17 Such evidence has
Celebrezze v. Bolas, 316 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1963). But see Sorenson v. Wein-
berger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 (4th Cir. 1975).
15. See, e.g., LeMaster v. Weinberger, 533 F.2d 337, 338 (6th Cir. 1976); Ra-
mirez v. Secretary of HEW, 528 F.2d 902, 903 (1st Cir. 1976); Kirkland v. Wein-
berger, 480 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 913 (1973); Davis v.
Richardson, 460 F.2d 772, 775-6 (3d Cir. 1972); Harmon v. Finch, 460 F.2d 1229,
1231 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Harmon v. Richardson, 409 U.S. 1063
(1972); Sellars v. Secretary of H.E.W., 458 F.2d 984, 986 (8th Cir. 1972); Jeralds v.
Richardson, 445 F.2d 36, 38 (7th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. Finch, 437 F.2d 1321, 1322
n.2 (10th Cir. 1971); Dixon v. Gardner, 406 F.2d 1035, 1036 (4th Cir. 1969). This
interpretation is consistent with the regulations, which state that "[t] o become
entitled to disability insurance benefits, [an individual] must have disability in-
sured status in the first full month that [he or she is] disabled ...... 45 Fed.
Reg. 25,387 (1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(b)(1)). This has also
been recognized by the commentators. See, e.g., Haviland & Glomb, The Disa-
bility Insurance Benefits Program and Low Income Claimants in Appalachia,
73 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 134 (1971).
16. These decisions often give little explanation of their reasoning. For ex-
ample, in Rodriquez v. Califano, the court stated without elaboration that the
rule is well established that, even if an individual is currently disabled because
of an impairment that had its origins during a period of insured status, the indi-
vidual is not eligible for benefits unless he or she was totally disabled on his or
her last insured date. 431 F. Supp. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see Davila v. Wein-
berger, 408 F. Supp. 738, 741 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Capaldi v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp.
502, 503 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Gibson v. Celebrezze, 220 F. Supp. 271, 272 (E.D. Ky.
1963). See generally Estep v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 757, 758 (6th Cir. 1975); Har-
rison v. Richardson, 448 F.2d 638, 639 (6th Cir. 1971); De Nafo v. Finch, 436 F.2d
737, 739 (3d Cir. 1971); Henry v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 191, 195 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 993 (1967).
17. For example, in Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1972),
the court stated:
[E]vidence bearing upon an applicant's condition subsequent to
the date upon which the earnings requirement was last met is perti-
nent evidence in that it may disclose the severity and continuity of im-
pairments existing before the earnings requirement date or may
identify additional impairments which could reasonably be presumed
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been admitted in two different factual circumstances. In the
first circumstance, the claimant has offered the evidence be-
cause little or no evidence was derived at the time of the claim-
ant's last insured date, and thus only subsequently derived
evidence is available to prove that the claimant was disabled on
that date.18 In the second circumstance, the claimant has of-
fered the subsequently derived evidence either because it con-
tradicts evidence derived at the time of the claimant's last
insured date, or because the earlier derived evidence is incon-
clusive.19 Even in these cases, the courts require claimants to
to have been present and to have imposed limitations as of the earn-
ings requirement date.
Id. at 41-42 (quoting Carnevale v. Gardner, 393 F.2d 889, 890 (2d Cir. 1968)); see
Stawls v. Califano, 596 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1979); Kemp v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d
967 (9th Cir. .1975); Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1974); Payne v.
Weinberger, 480 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1973); Moore v. Finch, 418 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir.
1969); Berven v. Gardner, 414 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1969); Stock v. Secretary of
HEW, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] UNE mL INs. REP. (CCH) 14,602 (D. Or.
1976); Reese v. Richardson, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] UNEuPL INS. REP.
(CCH) T 16,321 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
For a discussion on proving prior disabilities with contemporary medical
findings, see Rowland, Judicial Review of Disability Determinations, 52 GEo.
L.J. 42, 70-76 (1963).
18. In this situation the claimant usually maintains that he or she was dis-
abled during a period of coverage but is unable to substantiate such a claim
with objective medical evidence derived near the last insured date. The claim-
ant can, however, prove that he or she is currently disabled. When faced with
this situation, some courts have allowed the subsequently derived evidence to
create an inference that the claimant was disabled on the last insured date.
For example, in Moore v. Finch, 418 F.2d 1224 (4th Cir. 1969), the claimant's last
insured date was September 30, 1960. The only evidence of disability derived at
that time was the testimony of the claimant's wife and other witnesses that the
claimant was mentally disabled. In 1966 and 1967, however, the claimant was
clinically diagnosed as disabled due to a psychoneurotic anxiety reaction. The
Secretary conceded that in 1966 and 1967 the claimant's mental and emotional
status was impaired, but would not allow that evidence to be considered for the
purpose of creating an inference that the claimant was disabled on his last in-
sured date in 1960. The court remanded the case for rehearing, stating: "[T]he
record is not so persuasive as to rule out any linkage of the final state of [claim-
ant] with his earlier symptoms. Certainly, it is arbitrary to declare
preemptorily that the two could not be related in tracing causation." Id. at
1226; see Capaldi v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 502, 505-06 (E.D. Pa. 1975). But see
Cook v. Califano, 569 F.2d 1328, 1329-30 (5th Cir. 1978); Davison v. Celebrezze,
340 F.2d 606, 606 (5th Cir. 1965).
19. In this instance the subsequently derived evidence is essential to the
claimant's case, for without it the claimant will be unable to establish his or her
case or to rebut the Secretary's case. For example, in Stawls v. Califano, 596
F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1979), the claimant's last insured date was June 30, 1962. The
claimant maintained that she was disabled due to schizophrenia as of this date.
Based on the medical evidence derived prior to June 30, 1962, the district court
found that the Secretary's decision denying benefits was supported by substan-
tial evidence. By upholding the Secretary, the court did not need to "consider
the medical evidence concerning [appellant's] mental condition subsequent to
September 30, 1962." Id. at 1212 (quoting from the district court opinion). The
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prove that they were disabled prior to the expiration of their
disability coverage, admitting the subsequently derived evi-
dence only to prove retrospectively that the claimant was dis-
abled during the time he or she was insured.20
In Cassel, however, the District Court of Colorado held that
claimant Cassel would be eligible for disability insurance bene-
fits if she could prove that her disability had its origin at a time
when she was covered by disability insurance.2 1 Asserting that
circuit court disagreed and remanded the case, stating: "[Elven assuming that
schizophrenia is progressive in nature, proof the appellant was disabled due to
schizophrenia after June 30, 1962 is probative of the fact that she may have
been disabled due to schizophrenia before June 30, 1962, although it is not con-
clusive." Id. at 1213; see Selig v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 594, 600-01 (E.D.N.Y.
1974). But see Steimer v. Gardner, 395 F.2d 197, 198 (9th Cir. 1968) ("The perti-
nent date is June 30, 1955, the date when her insured status terminated. Much
of the evidence relates to occurrences since that time, which have only tangen-
tial relevance.").
20. In most of the cases considering the admissibility of evidence derived
after the expiration of the applicant's insured status, the courts have explicitly
stated that to be eligible for benefits an individual must be disabled as of his or
her last insured date, and then have allowed the introduction of subsequently
derived evidence to prove retrospectively that the claimant was disabled during
the time he or she was insured. See, e.g., Selig v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 594,
599-600 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). Courts reason that this procedure accords with the
rule that the Social Security Act, as a remedial statute, is to be construed liber-
ally to find disability. See, e.g., Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d 38, 41 (2d
Cir. 1972); Selig v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 504, 600 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); see note 14
supra.
Nevertheless, the admission of subsequently derived evidence to prove dis-
ability retrospectively could be used to circumvent the rule that an individual
must be disabled on his or her last insured date to be eligible for benefits by
permitting courts to draw questionable inferences of insured date disability on
the basis of new evidence of a progressive illness. For example, in Stark v.
Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1974), the court, over a strong dissent,
awarded benefits to a claimant who was suffering from scleroderma, a progres-
sive, incurable disease, from as early" as 1930. The claimant's last insured date
was in 1950 but she was not "properly" diagnosed as disabled until 1960. The
court awarded benefits even though the claimant was able to engage in sub-
stantial gainful activity as late as 1958, reasoning that if the claimant had been
properly diagnosed in 1951 she would have been advised to avoid the kind of
work she had been doing. Id. at 1098. Stark is a typical latent disability case.
The claimant was clearly disabled subsequent to the expiration of her insured
status due to a disease that had its origin during a period of insured status, but
the claimant could also work subsequent to the expiration of her insured sta-
tus. Although Cassel may have been a case in which subsequently derived evi-
dence could have been used to prove disability retrospectively, the court chose
to define and confront the latent disability issue directly.
21. The question of latent disability arose because, as the court stated,
"HHS has acknowledged that Cassel's medical reports indicate a significant im-
pairment within a year after her insured status terminated. Moreover, Cassel's
medical records suggest a long history of back problems that may have been
present during the time when she was insured." 493 F. Supp. at 1057. The court
commented that, even if Cassel did not become disabled during a period of cov-
erage, she may have become disabled after she was last insured due to a condi-
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Congress did not anticipate or contemplate the problem of la-
tent disability,22 the court addressed the latent disability ques-
tion by looking to the general purposes of the Social Security
disability insurance program.23 The court found that the pur-
pose of the program was "to aid workers who, after having
made a contribution to the nation's work force, are unable to
continue."24 Noting that the Social Security Act is a remedial
statute that should be broadly construed,25 the court reasoned
that a failure to provide benefits to the latently disabled "would
disregard the special plight of those persons who contribute to
the nation's output, but who become too sick to work regu-
larly-then grow progressively sicker, but not sick enough to
obtain disability benefits until they no longer are currently in-
sured."26
In reaching its result, the court also drew an analogy be-
tween the Social Security disability insurance program and
state workers' compensation statutes. 27 The court thought the
two programs were similar because both "operate to protect
workers from loss of income due to disability."2 8 Thus, the
court argued, since workers' compensation benefits are typi-
cally provided to those whose latent disabilities originated from
a work-related cause, Social Security disability insurance bene-
fits ought to be available to those whose disability had its in-
ception during the insured period.29 Nevertheless, the court
tion that had its inception during an insured period. The court concluded that,
to determine if the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence,
it needed more specific administrative findings on the issue of whether Cassel
became disabled during a time when she was insured. See note 6 supra.
22. 493 F. Supp. at 1057.
23. Id. at 1057-58.
24. Id. at 1058 (quoting Coleman v. Gardner, 264 F. Supp. 714, 718 (S.D. W.
Va. 1967)).
25. The Cassel court stated that "[a]s a remedial statute, the Social Secur-
ity Act is 'to be broadly considered and liberally applied."' Id. at 1058 (quoting
Stewart v. Cohen, 309 F. Supp. 949, 956 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)). See note 14 supra.
26. Id. at 1058. The Cassel court went on to note that it "would be both
senseless and insensitive to find that a worker who contributes his or her share
of earnings into the social security fund, and suffers a latent disability while do-
ing so, cannot collect from that same fund merely because of the peculiar na-
ture, evolution, or timing of the disability." Id. See generally Haviland &
Glomb, supra note 15.
27. 493 F. Supp. at 1058.
28. Id. at 1057 n.1.
29. Id. at 1057-58. The court noted that the statute of limitations does not
begin to run on a workers' compensation claim until a disability becomes evi-
dent, thus allowing an eventual employment-related injury to be compensated
years later. Id. at 1058 (citing California case law). This appears to be the gen-
eral rule under many workers' compensation statutes, although there are ex-
ceptions. See 3 A. LARSEN, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 78.42
1008 [Vol. 65:1002
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emphasized that the plaintiff still had the "heavy burden" of es-
tablishing a factual link between the insured period and the
later disability30 and remanded the case to H-S for further ad-
ministrative findings on these factual issues.3 1
An analysis of the objectives of the Act 32 suggests that the
Cassel court may have been correct in finding that some la-
tently disabled individuals should be covered by the Act, but
incorrect in assuming that the judiciary should extend benefits
to these individuals. 33 In reading the purpose of section 223(a)
broadly "to aid workers who, after having made a contribution
to the nation's work force, are unable to continue,"34 and in
mandating the payment of disability insurance benefits to la-
tently disabled individuals, the Cassel court ignored the legisla-
tively expressed purposes of the section and misconstrued the
intended operation of the disability insurance program. 35 The
(1976). The court concluded that, in a similar way, a disability for Social Secur-
ity purposes should relate back to the period of insurance coverage if the disa-
bility is clearly traceable to a latent condition that existed when the individual
was insured. 493 F. Supp. at 1058.
30. In describing this burden the Cassel court stated:
In order to establish the existence of a latent disability, however, the
plaintiff carries a heavy burden of establishing- (1) with a high degree
of medical probability that her disabling condition had its genesis
when she was covered by disability insurance; (2) that the condition
was potentially disabling; (3) that the disabling capacity of the condi-
tion lay dormant and did not manifest itself during the period of her
disability insurance 'coverage; (4) that the present disability she now
claims evolved directly, naturally and exclusively from the condition
that originated during the time she was insured.
Id. at 1058.
31. Id.
32. In a broad sense, the purpose of the disability program is to obviate,
through a program of forced savings, the.economic dislocations that typically
acompany disability. See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 283 (1979).
33. See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
34. 493 F. Supp. at 1058 (quoting Coleman v. Gardner, 264 F. Supp. 714, 718
(S.D.W.Va. 1967)).
35. As addressed by the court, the question of whether latently disabled
individuals are eligible for benefits under the Act is one of statutory interpreta-
tion. In the alternative, the Cassel court could have addressed the issue on a
constitutional level, i.e. whether denying Social Security disability insurance
benefits to a latently disabled individual is a violation of the equal protection
clause. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality
of the twenty-out-of-forty-quarters requirement, the lower courts that have ad-
dressed the issue have held that the requirement does not violate the due pro-
cess clause or the equal protection clause. Tuttle v. Secretary of HEW, 504 F.2d
61, 63 (10th Cir. 1974); Townsley v. Weinberger, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
U EmpL. INS. REP. (CCH) 14,866 (N.D. Cali. 1976); Colon v. Secretary of HEW
[1974 Transfer Binder] UNEPL INS. REP. (CCH) 17,578 (S.D. Fla. 1974). See
generally Lerner v. Richardson, 393 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D. Pa. 1975). This result is
correct in light of the minimum rationality test applied to social welfare cases
not involving a suspect class. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977); Ma-
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legislative history of the Act clearly indicates that the actual
purposes of the program are much narrower first, to provide
benefits only to those who have made a substantial contribu-
tion to the program so as to guarantee the self-supporting na-
ture of the program, 36 and second, to provide benefits to those
who are dependent upon their earnings, but unable to work be-
cause of a disability.37
The vehicle that Congress chose to accomplish these pur-
poses was an insurance program, not a general welfare pro-
gram.38 The requirement that an individual pay twenty
quarters of "premium" to be eligible for benefits achieves the
first purpose by guaranteeing that each potential recipient of
benefits makes a substantial contribution to the program.3 9
The additional requirement that an individual earn twenty
quarters of coverage within the last forty quarters before the
onset of disability is an attempt to achieve the second objective
by limiting benefits to those whose covered employment was
thews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768
(1975). Although the twenty-out-of-forty-quarters requirement is under-inclu-
sive and the "benign purpose" of the Act encompasses some latent disability
cases, there are legitimate reasons for placing limits on the program. See
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 56-57 (1977) (the quarters requirement "is simple
to administer" and is a reliable indicator of dependency on earnings).
36. S. REP. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3877, 3893. See Tuttle v. Secretary of HEW, 504 F.2d 61, 62
(10th Cir. 1974); Lerner v. Richardson, 393 F. Supp. 1387, 1389-90 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
("Congress has found it necessary to build into the Social Security System a
formula designed to prevent the dissipation of the Social Security Fund by
those groups who have made limited contributions to the fund. .. ").
37. See H.R. REP. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1958), S. REP. No. 2388,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in [19581 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4218,
4229. See also Tuttle v. Secretary of HEW, 504 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1974); Ler-
ner v. Richardson, 393 F. Supp. 1387, 1389-90 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("Congress has
found it necessary to build into.the Social Security System a formula designed
to ... protect those individuals who have been in covered employment for a
considerable portion of their working lives."). See generally S. REP. No. 1987,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3710,
3729; H.R. REP. No. 1698, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1954).
38. The analogy between Social Security and insurance has been severely
criticized. See, e.g., R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DisABnrrY AND MASS JUSTICE:
A PROBLEM IN WELFARE ADJUDICATION 21-23 (1973); Cowan, Background and
History: The Crisis in Public Finance and Social Security, in THE CRISIS m SO-
CIAL SECURTY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 2 (M. Boskin ed. 1977). Neverthe-
less, the insurance concept is accurate in the sense that an individual must first
make a contribution (premium payment) before he or she is entitled to bene-
fits. In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized the insurance character of
the Social Security system. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 296 (1979) ('"The de-
sire to alleviate hardship wherever it is found is tempered by the concern that
the social security system in this country remain a contributory insurance plan
and not become a general welfare program.").
39. Tuttle v. Secretary of HEW, 504 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1974).
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sufficiently long and sufficiently recent to suggest that they
probably had been dependent upon their earnings.4 0 As the
legislative history of the section states:
Under a program which provides protection against loss of earnings on
account of disability, it is reasonable and desirable that there be relia-
ble means of limiting such protection to those persons who have had
sufficiently long and sufficiently recent covered employment to indicate
that they probably have been dependent upon their earnings. It was to
meet this purpose that the disability work requirements were designed
41
The twenty-out-of-forty-quarters requirement reflects the con-
gressional judgment that it would simply be administratively
burdensome to determine on a case-by-case basis whether, in
fact, individuals were dependent upon their earnings.4 2 Thus,
Congress created a presumption that individuals who contrib-
uted twenty out of forty quarters are dependent upon their
earnings. Whether these individuals actually are dependent
upon their earnings is generally considered irrelevant in deter-
mining eligibility for benefits.43
The twenty-out-of-forty-quarters requirement does allow
brief periods of involuntary and voluntary unemployment with-
out loss of disability coverage.4 4 In fashioning the requirement,
Congress recognized that individuals dependent upon their
earnings, while not technically disabled, might still be forced to
retire early because of impairments caused by progressive ill-
nesses.4 5 To expand the availability of benefits to those suffer-
ing from such illnesses, Congress abolished the six-out-of-
thirteen-quarters requirement that had been imposed prior to
1958 in addition to the present twenty-out-of-forty-quarters re-
quirement.4 6 Thus, it seems clear that Congress intended to
40. S. REP. No. 2388, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in [1958] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4218, 4229.
41. Id.
42. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977).
43. See id.
44. See text accompanying notes 47-48 infra.
45. See S. REP. No. 2388, 85 Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4218, 4222. In further describing the group of disabled per-
sons the 1958 Amendments were to affect, the Senate report states:
In many instances, these are persons whose work was interrupted by a
progressive illness and who at the onset of this impairment met the
work requirements for disability protection. It is not uncommon that
an impairment which is not severe enough to meet the definition of dis-
ability in the law causes a worker to be absent from work for extended
periods. The result is that by the time the impairment becomes serious
enough to meet the definition of disability, the worker has lost his cur-
rently insured status.
Id. at 13, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4218, 4230.
46. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
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extend coverage to some claimants who involuntarily retired
because of a progressive illness.
Implicit in the present requirement is the recognition that
individuals dependent upon their earnings might be involunta-
rily unemployed for reasons other than progressive illness or
disability,47 or might choose to be voluntarily unemployed for
brief periods.48 An individual might be unemployed for a
number of quarters, for example, because he or she is laid off
or because his or her skills have become technologically obso-
lete. An individual might also choose voluntary unemployment
for a short period in order to obtain additional training to qual-
ify for additional jobs. The twenty-out-of-forty-quarters re-
quirement thus allows a limited amount of such involuntary
and voluntary unemployment without a resultant termination
of eligibility for disability benefits.
The Cassel court fashioned relief broader than that justi-
fied by the legislative history and by the statutory language be-
cause the court ignored the second purpose of the disability
insurance program-to provide benefits to disabled individuals
who were dependent upon their income.49 Although the court
asserted that Congress did not contemplate the problem of la-
tent disability,0 the legislative history and the 1958 amendment
mentioned above indicate that Congress was aware of the
47. The twenty quarters requirement operates to establish that claimants
have a reasonably substantial attachment to the labor force. Clearly, however,
individuals who are involuntarily unemployed have not voluntarily retired from
gainful activity and if they subsequently become disabled they will have been
compelled to leave the labor force by reason of their disability.
The legislative history of the 1958 amendments reveals that Congress rec-
ognized that differentiating between insured individuals who became disabled
and individuals with latent disabilities who lost their insured status because of
involuntary unemployment does not accomplish the objectives of the Act. Al-
though the legislative history indicates that the prior work requirements gener-
ally produce results in accordance with the purpose that only those individuals
who are probably dependent on their earnings are awarded benefits, Congress
recognized that this is not always the case. Therefore, the Act was amended to
eliminate the current insurance requirement so that benefits would not be de-
nied to individuals whose earnings have been cut off as a result of a disability.
S. REP. No. 2388, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4218, 4229-30.
48. But see H.R. REP. No. 1189, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1956) ("eligibility
... will be limited to persons who.., have demonstrated a capacity and a will
to work"). Although the legislative history makes no mention of periods of vol-
untary unemployment, the effect of the present twenty-out-of-forty-quarters re-
quirement is clearly to allow such periods.
49. The first purpose-ensuring that each claimant makes a substantial
contribution to the program-was not at issue in the case, since it was undis-
puted that Cassel had fulfilled the twenty quarters of coverage requirement.
50. The Cassel court stated that "[a] reading of the Act itself leaves the
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plight of those suffering from progressive illnesses.5 1 Nonethe-
less, because Congress did not want to mandate determina-
tions of dependence in fact, yet wished to direct benefits
primarily towards those who were forced to leave employment
because of their illnesses, Congress extended insured status
only to a maximum of twenty quarters beyond the individual's
last covered date of employment. Had Congress intended to
extend coverage to all progressive illnesses or latent disabili-
ties having their origins in a covered quarter, it would have
done away with the twenty-quarter extension and would have
required only that the disability have its origin during the
twenty covered quarters. Although the present requirement
may work hardships on some individuals suffering from a pro-
gressive illness or a latent disability,52 Congress chose to retain
the twenty-out-of-forty-quarters requirement, and the Cassel
court failed to cite specific authority to justify its decision to
upset that judgment.5 3
The court also fashioned its relief without considering that
the necessary implication of its decision was to allow disability
benefits even when a claimant has been voluntarily unem-
ployed for over twenty quarters.5 4 This result surely does not
comport with the expressed intent of the Act, which is to pro-
vide benefits to those dependent upon their earnings, and goes
beyond even the most liberal interpretation of the operation of
the twenty-out-of-forty-quarters requirement.
The Cassel court's failure to consider the Act's second pur-
pose of limiting benefits to only those disabled individuals who
distinct impression that Congress did not anticipate, and thus did not contem-
plate, the question of latent disability." 493 F. Supp. at 1057.
51. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
52. Id. Because the twenty-out-of-forty-quarters requirement is different
only in degree from the current insurance requirement, see note 47 s.upra,
some individuals with latent disabilities are still denied benefits.
53. Absent any assertion by the Cassel court that the requirements of the
Act are ambiguous or unclear, the court's reasoning does not support its award
of benefits to individuals excluded by the express terms of the Act. Cf. Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (no private right of action under
§ 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act where the section by its terms does not
purport to create a private right of action). In a Social Security case the
Supreme Court has stated that "[gleneral rules are essential if a fund of this
magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though
such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some indi-
vidual cases." Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977).
54. For example, an individual who developed the symptoms of a slowly
debilitating disease while insured, but who simply decided to quit working
even though fully able to work and who subsequently became totally disabled
more than twenty quarters after quitting work, would be eligible for benefits
under thecourt's holding.
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were dependent upon their earnings is most clearly evidenced
by the court's flawed analogy between the operation of work-
ers' compensation and Social Security disability insurance. Al-
though the court noted that both workers' compensation and
disability benefits "operate to protect workers from loss of in-
come due to disability,"55 it failed to delineate adequately the
differences in the purposes of the two programs. 6 Workers'
compensation is based on a form of strict tort liability,5 7
whereby injured workers are compensated for work related in-
juries.5 8 Because individuals are compensated by virtue of
their injuries, regardless of the length of time they have
worked, there is no earnings requirement analogous to that for
Social Security disability benefits. Latent injuries, if work re-
lated, are compensable. The statute of limitations for filing a
worker's compensation claim does not begin to run until a disa-
bility becomes evident;59 thus, a worker may receive benefits
55. 493 F. Supp. at 1057 n.1. Only some workers' compensation statutes op-
erate in this manner, however. Basically, workers' compensation benefits are
based on one of two theories: the "earning impairment theory" or the "physical
impairment theory." 2 A. LARSON, supra note 29, at § 57.14(a) (1980). Under the
former theory, benefits are based on either actual or presumed loss of earning
capacity. Under the latter theory, benefits are based on a schedule that takes
into account only the type of injury sustained. Only under the "earning impair-
ment theory" can a workers' compensation law be said to operate to protect
workers from loss of income due to disability. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that the rationale for the existence of each program is fundamentally different
and, therefore, any argument the court made by analogy is unpersuasive. In
addition, the actual functioning of the two programs differs dramatically. See
R. DiXoN, supra note 38, at 115-29.
56. See R. DIXON, supra note 38, at 115-29; 1 A. LARSON, supra note 29, § 3
(1978); Abraham & Wolkstein, Workmen's Compensation and the Social Secur-
ity Disability Program: A Contrast, 16 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (1963).
57. Even the Cassel court recognized this. See 493 F. Supp. at 1057 n.1.
The theory underlying workers' compensation statutes is that the cost of indus-
trial accidents should be passed on to the consumer. W. PROSSE, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 80 (4th ed. 1971). As a substitute for common law tort
actions, workers' compensation is a compromise by which workers accept lim-
ited compensation, usually less than the estimate that a jury might place upon
their damages, in return for extended liability of the employer and an assur-
ance that they will be paid. Accordingly, even though their damages are partly
not compensated under the workers' compensation statute, workers have no
cause of action based on the negligence of their employers. Id.; see United
States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151 (1966). For a discussion of the contrast be-
tween workers' compensation and tort law, see 1 A. LARSON, supra note 29, § 2
(1978).
58. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1972);
United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151 (1966); J. CHELIUS, WORKPLACE
SAFETY AND HEALTH 17-23 (1977). See generally J. TURNBuiz, C. WnIIAMS, JR.,
& E. CHEIT, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SECURrrY 297-331 (4th ed. 1973); Abraham &
Wolkstein, supra note 56, at 1065-66.
59. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
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for a late-developing disability by demonstrating that it is work
related. Private insurers, who operate the system, maintain the
balance between premiums and payments through the pay-
ment of claims only to those able to prove work related inju-
ries.60
Underlying Social Security disability insurance, however, is
the concept of public insurance. This insurance concept re-
quires that an individual earn coverage by working for a spe-
cific period of time, and protects those who are insured from
loss of earnings due to disability. In contrast to workers' com-
pensation, disability insurance is financed without regard to
risk through Social Security taxes.61 The government controls
the balance of premiums and payments, not through ratemak-
ing based upon risk and causation, but through broad tax ad-
justments and limitations on the extent to which claimants can
receive benefits after their payments of "premium" have
stopped. Obviously, these limitations must be fashioned to ac-
complish the purposes of the Act. In the case of disability in-
surance, one stated purpose is to provide benefits to the
disabled who were dependent upon their earnings; the limita-
tion to accomplish this purpose is the twenty-out-of-forty-
quarters requirement. The Social Security disability insurance
program has no statute of limitations provision similar to that
in workers' compensation statutes. Such a provision is inap-
propriate for a program in which eligibility is based on the
claimant's insured status and not on the nature of the claim-
ant's injury. These fundamental differences in the purposes of
60. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 29, § 3 (1978).
61. A major distinction between private and public insurance is the
method each uses to determine actuarial soundness. This distinction was de-
scribed in the House of Representatives report that accompanied the 1958
amendments as follows:
Thus, the concept of "unfunded accrued liability" does not by any
means have the same significance for a [public] insurance system as it
does for a plan established under private insurance principles. In a pri-
vate insurance program, the insurance company or other administering
institution must have sufficient funds on hand so that if operations are
terminated, the plan will be in a position to pay off all the accrued lia-
bilities. This, however, is not a necessary basis for a national compul-
sory social insurance.system. It can reasonably be presumed that
under Government auspices such a system will continue indefinitely
into the future. The test of financial soundness then is not a question
of sufficient funds on hand to pay off all accrued liabilities. Rather the
test is whether the expected future income from tax contributions and
from interest on invested assets will be sufficient to meet anticipated
expenditures for benefits and administrative costs. Thus, it is quite
proper to count both on receiving contributions from new entrants to
the system in the future and on paying benefits to this group.
H.R. REP. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1958).
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the two programs and the means by which these purposes are
achieved preclude using an analogy to workers' compensation
as justification for awarding disability insurance benefits to a
class of individuals not covered by the express terms of the
Act.
Although the Cassel court usurped legislative authority in
holding that latently disabled individuals are entitled to disabil-
ity insurance benefits, the court correctly identified an inherent
unfairness of the current twenty-out-of-forty-quarters require-
ment.62 Critics of expanding Social Security coverage can legit-
imately argue that any expansion is unwarranted because of
the Act's long history of financial difficulties,6 3 but Congress
should consider any reform proposal that can more nearly ac-
complish the goals of the Act without increasing the financial
pressure on the system.
One possible solution 64 to the problem would be for Con-
62. The Cassel court described this unfairness as follows:
It would be both senseless and insensitive to find that a worker who
contributes his or her share of earnings into the social security fund,
and suffers a latent disability while doing so, cannot collect from that
same fund merely because of the peculiar nature, evolution, or timing
of the disability.
493 F. Supp. at 1058.
63. See, e.g., Swardson, Silver Threads, but no Gold, Maybe, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 12, 1980, at 23, col. 2.
64. There are many additional solutions that could be considered, but all
present greater difficulties than do those discussed in the text. One possible
solution would be a judicial determination on a case-by-case basis of whether
the claimant in fact satisfies the purposes of the Act. This proposal would ex-
tend coverage to additional claimants without eliminating the coverage to those
whom Congress did not intend to benefit-individuals who voluntarily retire
and are not dependent on their earnings but become totally disabled during
their retirement period. Such a judicial solution would increase financial pres-
sure on the Social Security system, but would not significantly aid in achieving
the Act's purposes.
Another solution would be to create a statutory presumption of disability.
For example, if an individual became disabled as a result of nontraumatic ill-
ness within a certain number of years after the expiration of his or her insured
status, the individual would be eligible for benefits if he or she otherwise quali-
fies. Even though this solution requires that the disability result from a non-
traumatic event (i.e., a slowly debilitating disease) the second objective of the
Act would be violated in many instances because individuals who voluntarily
quit working would be eligible for benefits. In addition to being overinclusive,
this solution would be underinclusive in that some individuals with progressive
disabilities who did not become disabled until after the expiration of the statu-
tory presumption would be denied benefits even though the objectives of the
Act mandate that they should receive benefits.
A third solution would be to change the insurance requirement. This could
be done in either of two ways. First, a permanent insurance provision could be
enacted whereby an individual would always have insured status after earning
a given number of quarters of coverage. See Haviland & Glomb, supra note 15,
at 135. This solution would violate the second objective of the Act, however.
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gress to adopt the Cassel court's approach by amending the Act
so that an applicant would be eligible for benefits if he or she
established that the disability's onset occurred during a cov-
ered period even though the applicant's coverage has since
lapsed. Although this solution may effectively allow coverage
for applicants suffering from a latent disability, it clearly goes
beyond Congress' intention to limit coverage to those who have
made a substantial contribution to the work force and are de-
pendent on their earnings. 65 Applicants who have been volun-
tarily unemployed for many years could still qualify for
benefits under this proposal. In addition, the number of poten-
tial beneficiaries could increase substantially, which would
threaten the system's ability to remain self-supporting.66 Al-
lowing a claimant to establish the onset of a disability also
presents proof problems: years later it will be extremely diffi-
cult to determine the exact date of a disability's origin.67 A
case-by-case determination of whether an individual's disabil-
ity had its onset within a covered period would also prove ad-
ministratively burdensome.
A better solution, however, would be to modify both the
present statutory presumption of dependency on earnings and
the manner in which this presumption is applied. This propo-
sal would better achieve congressional purposes without sub-
stantially increasing administrative costs. First, a "waiver of
premium" principle,68 such as that already used in determining
fully insured status for Social Security retirement benefits
under section 202(a) 69 of the Act, should be adopted. Under
section 202(a), the time during which an individual is disabled
An individual, after acquiring permanent insurance status, could voluntarily
stop working and still be eligible for benefits. Second, the recency of work or
twenty-out-of-forty-quarters requirement could be changed. For example, a
person would be insured if he or she had earned one quarter of coverage for
every two elapsed quarters since he or she earned his or her first quarter of
coverage, provided that at least twenty quarters of coverage had been earned.
This would violate neither the first nor the second objective of the Act, but
would not completely solve the problem. This solution would, however, proba-
bly alleviate some of the inequities of the present system, and would be easy to
administer.
65. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., .DIXON, supra note 38, at 63-92.
68. Two commentators who studied the effects of the Social Security disa-
bility insurance program on low income claimants in Appalachia suggested, but
did not elaborate upon, this approach. See Haviland & Glomb, supra note 15, at
135.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1976). An individual is entitled to old-age insurance
benefits if, among other things, he or she is fully insured. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)
(1976). The Social Security Act defines a fully insured individual as:
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is not included in the calculation of the number of years in
which an individual must have earned at least one quarter of
coverage to be eligible for retirement benefits.70 Similarly,
when an individual is involuntarily unemployed and therefore
unable to earn quarters of coverage, the period of time he or
she is unemployed should not count as part of the forty
quarters in the present twenty-out-of-forty-quarters require-
ment.7 ' This "waiver of premium" approach is consistent with
both objectives of the Act. It ensures that only those who have
made a significant contribution to the system will be awarded
benefits because only those who have earned at least twenty
quarters of coverage will be eligible for benefits. In addition,
this approach results in a more accurate identification of those
individuals who are probably dependent on their earnings.
The incorporation of this concept into the Social Security
disability program should not be too administratively burden-
some. A claimant would have to prove that he or she was invol-
untarily unemployed during a particular quarter for that
quarter to be exempted from the forty-quarter period. For ex-
ample, an able worker who is unable to find employment be-
cause of a slump in the economy, technological obsolescence,
or refusal of employers to hire him or her because of partial
disability would be permitted to prove involuntary unemploy-
ment in the same ways that inability to obtain employment is
proved for qualification for unemployment benefits.72 An indi-
any individual who had not less than-
(1) one quarter of coverage (whenever acquired) for each calen-
dar year elapsing after 1950 (or, if later, the year in which he attained
age 21) and before the year ... in which he attained age 62 ....
not counting as an elapsed year for purposes of paragraph (1) any year
any part of which was included in a period of disability (as defined in
section 416(i) of this title).
Id. § 414(a).
70. See note 47 supra.
71. See Haviland & Glomb, supra note 15, at 135.
72. For a quarter to be exempted under this plan an individual would not
have to actually qualify for unemployment benefits, although he or she may,
but rather an individual must meet certain of the eligibility criteria for receiv-
ing unemployment benefits. Although each state has its own unemployment
program, these programs have similar criteria for determining eligibility for un-
employment benefits. For example, among other things, all states require that
an unemployed worker file a claim for benefits, [1976] 1B UNEMPL. INS. REP.
(CCH) 1945, that the worker register for work and thereafter continue to re-
port at such times as the administrative agency may require, id. 1940, and
that the worker be able to work and be available for work, id. 1950. In addi-
tion, all states Will disqualify an individual for benefits either permanently or
temporarily if the individual refuses suitable work, id. 1 1965, has been dis-
charged for misconduct, id. 1970, left work voluntarily without good cause, id.
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vidual who became involuntarily unemployed because of recur-
ring illness would be permitted to prove involuntary
unemployment for one quarter, in the same way that he or she
would prove disability for twelve months for the purpose of re-
ceiving disability insurance benefits.73 The "waiver of pre-
mium" approach would thus eliminate many of the arbitrary
distinctions in the present system.
Because the "waiver of premium" approach will give bene-
fits to additional individuals, however, the twenty-out-of-forty-
quarters requirement should be modified to exclude, as much
as possible, any individuals whom Congress did not intend to
benefit. A decrease in coverage is essential to the Social Secur-
ity system's financial health, and would better reflect Congress'
concern that a claimant be dependent upon his or her earnings.
Thus, people who voluntarily retire for several years before be-
coming disabled should be excluded from benefits since they
are unlikely to be dependent on their earnings. Congress may
want to retain some provision for allowing short periods of vol-
untary unemployment without loss of disability coverage, how-
ever, to encourage people to obtain additional training or to
provide brief unemployment periods for female workers who
become pregnant.74 Both groups of individuals are arguably
more dependent on their earnings than those individuals pres-
ently covered who become disabled five years after voluntarily
retiring. In addition, Congress may want to make some allow-
ance for the difficulty of establishing the precise date of disabil-
ity.75 Under the "waiver of premium" approach, a few
claimants may still have difficulty establishing a quarter of dis-
ability even though they were prevented from working because
of illness. Replacing the present requirement with a twenty-
out-of-thirty-quarters requirement would eliminate coverage
for individuals that Congress did not intend to benefit and
would still ensure some flexibility without loss of disability cov-
erage for individuals dependent upon their earnings.
1975, or is unemployed due to a stoppage of work that exists because of a la-
bor dispute, id. 1980. Since the above information is routinely gathered by all
state agencies, it should not be too burdensome to determine when an individ-
ual has been involuntarily unemployed for a quarter. For an individual to have
a quarter exempted, he or she would have to register for work at the appropri-
ate state unemployment agency, be able to work and available for work, and
not be unemployed as a result of a disqualifying factor. When an individual
had satisfied these requirements, the appropriate entry would be made on his
or her earnings record.
73. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
74. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
75. See R. DIXON, supra note 38, at 63-92.
1981] 1019
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In the final analysis, although the Cassel court did usurp
legislative authority in allowing a blanket award of benefits to a
latently disabled individual, the court appears to be the first to
address specifically the problems presented by the Social Se-
curity system's treatment of such disabilities. The Cassel court
is correct in noting the hardship caused by denying benefits to
latently disabled individuals and in noting the failure of the Act
to accomplish fully its purposes. Nevertheless, the legislative
history of the Act clearly indicates that the court was incorrect
in assuming both that Congress never considered the issue of
latent disability and that if it had it would have acted as the
court did. Congress clearly decided not to give disability cover-
age to all latently disabled individuals. In addition, the court
failed to consider the increased financial burdens its decision
would have on the Social Security system itself. By extending
coverage without a corresponding decrease in coverage, the
court undermined Congress' goal of keeping the system self-
supporting. Moreover, because the Cassel court's solution for
the problem of disability coverage is judicially imposed, it is
subject to modification by other courts, which will make predic-
tions of financial requirements even more difficult.
The two modifications of the Act suggested above would
solve many of the problems raised by the Cassel decision. The
"waiver of premium" approach would expand coverage to those
not presently covered but within the category of individuals
Congress intended to benefit. The twenty-out-of-thirty-quarters
modification would decrease the coverage of individuals Con-
gress did not intend to benefit, but would preserve some flex-
ibility of coverage. The Cassel court and others might argue
that these modifications do not go far enough in extending in-
surance benefits to latently disabled individuals, but until and
unless Congress decides to transform the current disability in-
surance program into a more general welfare program, these
modifications would appear to be satisfactory means to relate
more fully the operation of the disability insurance program to
its purposes.
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